

## **Directors' Remuneration Policy**

This part of the Report sets out the Company's Directors' Remuneration Policy, which, subject to shareholder approval at the 2024 Annual General Meeting, shall take binding effect from the close of that meeting. The new Policy has been determined by the Committee. The Company's Directors' Remuneration Policy was most recently approved at the 2021 Annual General Meeting and has applied since the date of that meeting. The new Directors' Remuneration Policy does not make significant changes to the overall remuneration structure, and continues to reflect our reward strategy of providing competitive remuneration packages that promote the long-term success of the Company. As noted in the Statement from the Chair of the Remuneration Committee on pages 99-104, there are no significant differences between the Policy approved in 2021 and the new Policy.

## Executive Directors

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation	Maximum opportunity	Performance measures
<b>Base salary</b>			
Core element of fixed remuneration to reflect the individual's role and experience as part of a broadly market competitive total remuneration package, to enable the Group to recruit and maintain the required skills and expertise to enable it to achieve its strategy.	<p>Salary levels are determined taking into account a range of factors, which may include (but are not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Underlying Group performance;</li> <li>• The size and scope of the Executive Director's role and responsibilities;</li> <li>• The Executive Director's skill, experience and performance;</li> <li>• Salary levels for equivalent roles at other listed companies of a similar size and/ or complexity to the Group; and</li> <li>• Pay and conditions elsewhere in the Group.</li> </ul>	<p>Whilst there is no maximum salary level, salary increases will normally be within or below the range of increases awarded to the wider workforce in percentage of salary terms.</p> <p>Higher salary increases may be awarded in appropriate circumstances including but not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where an Executive Director has been promoted or has had a change in scope or responsibility;</li> <li>• To reflect an individual's development or performance in role (e.g. a newly appointed Executive Director being moved to align with the market over time); or</li> <li>• Where there has been a change in the size and/ or complexity of the business.</li> </ul> <p>Such increases may be implemented over such time period as the Committee deems appropriate.</p>	Not applicable.
<b>Benefits</b>			
To provide benefits as part of a broadly market competitive total remuneration package.	<p>Executive Directors receive benefits set at an appropriate level taking into account total remuneration, market practice, the benefits provided to other employees in the Group and individual circumstances. Benefits provided currently include car allowances and private health insurance.</p> <p>Other benefits may be provided based on individual circumstances. These may include, for example, relocation expenses and expatriate allowances.</p>	Whilst the Committee has not set an absolute maximum on the level of benefits Executive Directors may receive, the value of benefits is set at a level which the Committee considers to be appropriately positioned taking into account relevant market levels based on the nature and location of the role, the level of benefits provided for other employees in the Group and individual circumstances.	Not applicable.
<b>Retirement benefits</b>			
To provide an appropriate level of retirement benefit (or cash allowance equivalent) as part of a broadly market competitive total remuneration package.	<p>Executive Directors are eligible to participate in a defined contribution pension plan.</p> <p>Executive Directors may take a taxable cash supplement instead of some or all contributions to a pension plan.</p>	Company pension contribution (or cash allowance equivalent) not exceeding the contribution available to the majority of the workforce, as determined by the Committee (currently 4% in the UK).	Not applicable.

# Remuneration Report continued

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation	Maximum opportunity	Performance measures
<b>Annual bonus</b>			
<p>Rewards Executive Directors for achieving financial, strategic and/ or individual targets in the relevant year, to provide an incentive for achieving the Group's strategy.</p>	<p>Performance measures and targets are reviewed annually and pay-out levels are determined by the Committee after the year end based on performance against the targets. The Committee has discretion to amend the pay-out including in circumstances where any formulaic outcome does not reflect the Committee's assessment of overall performance or is not considered appropriate in the context of circumstances that were unexpected or unforeseen at the start of the relevant year.</p> <p>Ordinarily, up to 33% of the bonus earned will be deferred into an award of shares, which shall be released following the end of a two-year deferral period. The Committee may require or permit the deferral of higher levels of bonus. The Committee may pay the whole of any bonus earned in cash where the deferred amount would otherwise be below £10,000.</p> <p>Deferred bonus awards may take the form of a nil or nominal cost option to acquire the relevant shares following release, or as a requirement to invest the after-tax portion of the bonus into shares which must be retained until release.</p> <p>The Committee may award additional shares in respect of deferred amounts to reflect dividends that would have been paid on the deferred award shares over the period to their release; these dividend equivalents may assume the reinvestment of dividends into Company shares on such basis as the Committee determines.</p> <p><b>Recovery</b> Recovery provisions apply as summarised below the table.</p>	<p>Maximum annual bonus opportunity for Executive Directors is 150% of base salary, although for 2024 the opportunity will be limited to 120% of base salary.</p>	<p>Performance measures and targets are set annually reflecting the Company's strategy and aligned with key financial, strategic and/ or individual targets.</p> <p>For financial measures, subject to the Committee's discretion to override formulaic outturns, pay-out of up to 20% of maximum for threshold performance (the minimum level of performance resulting in any payment), 50% of maximum for on-target performance and full pay-out for stretch performance. There is ordinarily straight-line vesting between each of the points.</p> <p>For non-financial measures, a vesting schedule may apply on a similar basis to that described above for financial measures. Alternatively, the pay-out will be determined by the Committee between 0% and 100% based on its assessment of the extent to which the measure has been achieved.</p> <p>At least 50% of the bonus will be assessed against key financial performance measures which may include revenue, pre-tax profit or other key financial performance metrics of the Company. Any balance of the bonus may be assessed against non-financial strategic measures and/ or individual performance.</p>
<b>Buy As You Earn ("BAYE") Plan</b>			
<p>To create staff alignment with the Group and encourage share ownership.</p>	<p>Participants may acquire up to £12,000 of shares in respect of a year from their after-tax remuneration ("Purchased Shares"). Provided the Purchased Shares are retained in the plan and subject, ordinarily, to continued employment, additional "Matching Shares" are awarded on the basis of a 1 for 3 match following the end of each of the first, third and fifth years following the year in respect of which the purchased shares were acquired. For example, if 900 shares are purchased by a participant in respect of 2024, they will receive an additional 300 Matching Shares following the end of each of 2025, 2027 and 2029 (giving a total of 900 Matching Shares against the 900 shares purchased in 2024).</p> <p><b>Recovery</b> Recovery provisions apply to Matching Shares as summarised on page 121.</p>	<p>Maximum value of Purchased Shares that may be acquired in respect of any year is £12,000.</p> <p>The maximum ratio of Matching Shares to Purchased Shares is as described in the "Operation" column.</p>	<p>Not subject to performance measures, in line with typical market practice.</p>

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation	Maximum opportunity	Performance measures
<b>Performance Share Plan (“PSP”)</b>			
<p>To incentivise Executive Directors over the longer term, and to deliver performance-related pay, with a clear line of sight for Executives and direct alignment with shareholders’ interests.</p>	<p>Awards under the PSP will typically be granted as a conditional award or the grant of a nil or nominal cost option, in either case vesting subject to the achievement of specified performance conditions, over a period of at least three years.</p> <p>The Committee has discretion to adjust the formulaic vesting outturn including in circumstances where the formulaic outcome does not reflect the Committee’s assessment of overall performance, or is not considered appropriate in the context of circumstances that were unexpected or unforeseen at the date of grant.</p> <p>Awards are granted subject to a holding period of two years beginning on the vesting date either on the basis that they will not ordinarily be released (so that the participant is entitled to acquire the shares) until the end of that period or on the basis that the participant is entitled to acquire shares following the assessment of the applicable performance condition but that (other than as regards sales to cover tax liabilities) the award is not released (so that the participant is able to dispose of those shares) until the end of the holding period.</p> <p>Awards under the PSP may include the right to receive additional shares to reflect dividends paid over the vesting period and/ or the holding period; these dividend equivalents may assume the reinvestment of dividends into Company shares on such basis as the Committee determines.</p> <p>The Committee may at its discretion structure awards as Approved Performance Share Plan (“APSP”) awards comprising both a tax-favoured option with a per share exercise price equal to the market value of a share when the option is granted and a PSP award. APSP awards enable an Executive Director and the Company to benefit from tax-favoured option treatment in respect of part of the award without increasing the pre-tax value delivered to participants.</p> <p>APSP awards would be structured as either: (1) a tax-favoured option and a PSP award, with the vesting of the PSP award scaled back to take account of any gain made on exercise of the tax-favoured option; or (2) a tax favoured option, PSP award over a reduced number of shares and separate PSP award which is to fund the exercise price of the tax-favoured option. The provisions of this policy will apply to a tax-favoured option with any amendments necessary to take account of the applicable legislation. Other than to enable the grant of APSP awards, the Company will not grant market value options to Executive Directors.</p>	<p>The usual maximum award level under the PSP in respect of any financial year for Executive Directors is awards over shares with a value of 150% of salary. The approach proposed to the grant of PSP awards in respect of 2024 is described on page 112.</p> <p>The Committee has discretion to grant awards under the PSP in respect of any financial year for Executive Directors up to a maximum of 200% of salary.</p> <p>The Committee may at its discretion structure awards as Approved Performance Share Plan (“APSP”) awards as described in the “Operation” column. Reflecting the interaction between the tax-favoured option and the PSP award, the shares subject to the tax-favoured option are not taken into account when assessing these limits in order to avoid double counting.</p>	<p>Performance will be assessed against challenging performance targets.</p> <p>Performance will be based typically on financial measures including, but not limited to, EPS.</p> <p>Awards will also be subject to a financial underpin such that PSP awards will only vest if the Committee is satisfied with the overall performance of the Company.</p> <p>Performance measures (and their weighting where there is more than one measure) are reviewed annually to maintain appropriateness and relevance.</p> <p>Subject to the Committee’s discretion to override formulaic outturns, for threshold performance up to 25% of the award will vest, rising to 100% of the award vesting for maximum performance, typically with straight-line vesting in between. Below threshold performance, the award will not vest.</p>
	<p><b>Recovery</b> Recovery provisions apply as summarised below the table.</p>		

# Remuneration Report continued

## Information supporting the policy table

### Explanation of performance measures chosen

Performance measures for the annual bonus and PSP awards which reflect the Company's strategy are selected. Stretching performance targets are set each year by the Committee taking into account a number of different factors.

The annual bonus can be assessed against financial, strategic and/ or individual targets determined by the Committee with at least 50% subject to key financial targets. The Committee considers financial measures like profit before tax and revenue to be important performance metrics because they encourage behaviours that facilitate profitable growth and the successful future strategic development of the business. Strategic measures will be aligned to the Company's strategy in order that Executive Directors are appropriately rewarded for taking decisions which reflect the overall direction of the Group.

Long-term performance measures are chosen by the Committee to provide a robust and transparent basis on which to measure the Company's performance over the longer term and to provide alignment with the business strategy. They are selected to be aligned with the interests of shareholders and to drive business performance. Currently EPS performance is considered to be a key measure of success as it encapsulates the outcomes of many of the strategic drivers of the business, and helps align management incentives with growth in shareholder value.

The Committee retains the discretion to adjust or set different performance measures or targets where it considers it appropriate to do so (for example, to reflect a change in strategy, a material acquisition and/ or a divestment of a Group business or a change in prevailing market conditions) and to assess performance on a fair and consistent basis from year to year.

### Operation of the Company's share plans

The PSP, BAYE and any deferred bonus plan will be operated by the Committee in accordance with their rules, including the ability to adjust the number of shares subject to awards in the event of a variation of share capital, demerger, delisting, special dividend, rights issue or other event which may, in the opinion of the Committee, affect the current or future value of shares. All discretions available under the rules of any share plan will be available under this policy, except where expressly limited under this policy.

At the discretion of the Committee, awards under the PSP, BAYE and any deferred bonus plan may be settled, in whole or in part, in cash (or granted as a cash award over a notional number of shares). However, the Committee would only settle or grant an Executive Director's award in cash where the particular circumstances made that appropriate – for example in the event of a regulatory restriction on the delivery of shares, or in respect of the tax arising on the vesting or release of the award.

### Shareholding guidelines

To align the interests of Executive Directors with those of shareholders, the Committee has adopted shareholding guidelines which apply in employment and after cessation of employment. The Committee retains discretion to disapply or vary these provisions in exceptional circumstances.

### In employment

Executive Directors are required to retain half of any shares acquired under the PSP and any deferred bonus award (after sales to cover tax) until such time as their holding has a value equal to 200% of salary.

Shares subject to PSP awards which have vested but not been released, shares subject to released PSP awards which have not been exercised, and shares subject to deferred bonus awards count towards the guideline on a net of assumed tax basis.

### After cessation of employment

Shares are subject to this requirement only if they are acquired from share plan awards (PSP, BAYE Matching Shares and deferred bonuses) granted after 1 January 2020. The Executive Director must retain: (a) until the audit sign-off of the financial statements for the year in which they leave the business, such of those shares as are subject to this requirement as have a value equal to the in-employment guideline; and (b) until the audit sign-off of the financial statements for the following year, such of those shares as have a value equal to 50% of the in-employment guideline, or in either case and if fewer, all of those shares. The vesting of relevant share awards granted from 1 January 2020 onwards will be conditional upon the Executive Director agreeing to the shares being held in a nominee arrangement to enable the effective monitoring and implementation of this policy.

## Recovery

### Annual bonus

For up to three years following the payment of the non-deferred part of an annual bonus award, the Committee may require the repayment of some or the entire cash award paid (or may cancel or reduce any deferred share award or require the forfeiture of shares acquired pursuant to a deferred share award) in the event of fraud, dishonesty leading to a material misstatement of financial results, serious reputational damage, or material corporate failure.

### PSP and BAYE

At the discretion of the Committee, unvested PSP awards and unvested BAYE matching awards may be reduced, cancelled or have further conditions imposed in certain circumstances including (but not limited to):

- A material misstatement of the Company's audited financial results;
- A material failure of risk management by the Company or any subsidiary company within the Group;
- A material miscalculation of any performance measure;
- Serious reputational damage; or
- Material corporate failure.

For up to three years following the vesting of an award, the Committee may require the repayment (which may be affected by the cancellation or forfeiture of a vested but unreleased PSP award) of some or the entire award in the event of fraud, dishonesty leading to a material misstatement of financial results, serious reputational damage, or material corporate failure.

### Early vesting of awards

#### PSP

In the event of a change of control of the Company or other relevant corporate event (such as a demerger, delisting, special dividend or other event which may affect the value of an award), unvested awards under the PSP may vest in accordance with the rules of the PSP and vested but unreleased awards will be released. The Committee shall determine the extent to which an unvested award vests taking into account the extent to which the relevant performance condition has been satisfied; such vesting would ordinarily be on a time pro rata basis although the Committee has discretion not to apply time prorating.

#### Deferred bonus arrangements

In the event of a change of control of the Company or other relevant corporate event (such as a demerger, delisting, special dividend or other event which may affect the value of an award), deferred bonus awards will vest in full.

#### BAYE awards

In the event of change of control of the Company or other relevant corporate event (such as a demerger, delisting, special dividend or other event which may affect the value of an award), Matching Shares related to Purchased Shares acquired in respect of a completed year will vest. Other Matching Shares will lapse, unless the Committee determines otherwise.

### Cessation of employment

The treatment of PSP awards, deferred bonus awards and BAYE awards on cessation of employment is described on page 120.





# Remuneration Report continued

## Non-Executive Directors

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation	Other items
<p>To enable the Company to attract and retain Non-Executive Directors of the required calibre by offering market competitive rates</p>	<p>The Chair is paid a basic Chair fee which also covers the role of Chair of the Nomination Committee (for which no additional fee is paid, assuming that the two roles are held by the same individual).</p> <p>Non-Executive Directors receive a basic fee and additional fees for chairing of any Board committees, holding the position of Senior Independent Director, holding the position of Non-Executive Director designated for engagement with the workforce, or for other responsibilities or time commitments. The Chair's fee is determined by the Committee and the fees of the other Non-Executive Directors are determined by the Board.</p> <p>Fees are based on the time commitment and contribution expected for the role and the level of fees paid to Non-Executive Directors serving on the board of similar-sized UK listed companies.</p> <p>Overall fees paid to Non-Executive Directors will remain within the limit set by the Company's Articles of Association from time to time.</p>	<p>Non-Executive Directors may be eligible to be reimbursed travel and subsistence costs incurred in the performance of their duties and to receive other benefits relevant to the performance of their roles (and any tax thereon).</p> <p>The Non-Executive Directors do not participate in the Company's annual bonus, share plans or pension schemes or other benefit in kind arrangements.</p>

## Illustration of the application of remuneration policy

The following charts set out for each Executive Director an illustration of the application for 2024 of the remuneration policy set out above. The charts show the split of remuneration between fixed pay (base salary, taxable benefits and pension), annual bonus and PSP on the basis of minimum remuneration, remuneration receivable for performance in line with the Company's expectations, maximum remuneration, and maximum remuneration assuming a 50% increase in the share price in the case of the PSP. Having regard to FDM's approach to the determination of the number of shares subject to PSP awards as discussed on page 119, these charts assume, for simplicity, a grant of 100% of the lowest Executive Director's annual salary (£360,810). No dividends or dividend equivalents are taken into account in the calculations of the values in the charts. The BAYE is not taken into account for the purposes of these illustrations as the level of benefit will depend upon the Executive Director's decision as to the acquisition of Purchased Shares.



In illustrating the potential reward, the following assumptions have been made:

	Fixed pay	Annual bonus	PSP
<b>Minimum performance</b> Performance below plan approved by the Board.		No bonus.	No PSP vesting.
<b>Performance in line with expectations</b> Performance in line with plan approved by the Board.	Fixed elements of remuneration only:  Base salary applying as at 1 January 2024, as referred to on page 102 (being the latest known salary);	50% of maximum awarded (equivalent to 60% of salary).	25% of maximum awarded (i.e. £90,203 being 25% of the lowest Executive Director's salary).
<b>Maximum performance</b> Performance meets stretch target approved by the Board.	Taxable benefits as disclosed in the single figure table on page 108 for the year ended 31 December 2023; and	100% of maximum awarded (equivalent to 120% of salary).	100% of maximum awarded (i.e. £360,810 being 100% of the lowest Executive Director's salary).
<b>Maximum performance plus share price appreciation</b> Performance meets stretch target approved by the Board and for the purposes of the PSP element there is an assumed 50% increase in the share price.	Pension assuming an employer contribution of 4% of salary.	100% of maximum awarded (equivalent to 120% of salary).	100% of maximum awarded (i.e. £360,810 being 100% of the lowest Executive Director's salary) and an assumed 50% increase in the share price to vesting.



# Remuneration Report continued

## Policy for the remuneration of employees more generally

The Group aims to provide a remuneration package that is competitive in an employee's country of employment and which is appropriate to promote the long-term success of the Group. The Group intends to apply this policy fairly and consistently and does not intend to pay more than is necessary to attract and motivate staff. In respect of Executive Directors, a greater proportion of the remuneration package is "at risk" and determined by reference to performance conditions. Executive Directors and other employees are eligible to participate in the BAYE on the same basis.

## Approach to recruitment remuneration

When hiring a new Executive Director, the Committee will seek to align the remuneration package with the above policy.

When determining appropriate remuneration arrangements, the Committee may include other elements of pay which it considers are appropriate and necessary to recruit and retain the individual. However, this discretion is capped and is subject to the limits referred to below:

- Base salary will be set at a level appropriate to the role and the experience of the Director being appointed. This may include agreement on future increases up to a market rate, in line with increased experience and/ or responsibilities, subject to good performance, where it is considered appropriate;
- Benefits and pension will only be provided in line with the above policy;
- The Committee will not offer non-performance related incentive payments (for example a "guaranteed sign-on bonus" or "golden hello");
- A newly appointed Executive Director will be eligible to participate in the BAYE on the same basis as other Executive Directors and employees;
- Other elements may be included in the following circumstances:
  - An interim appointment being made to fill an Executive Director role on a short-term basis;
  - If exceptional circumstances require that the Chair or a Non-Executive Director takes on an executive function on a short-term basis;
  - If an Executive Director is recruited at a time in the year when it would be inappropriate to provide a bonus or long-term incentive award for that year as there would not be sufficient time to assess performance. Subject to the limit on variable remuneration set out below, the quantum in respect of the months employed during the year may be transferred to the subsequent year so that reward is provided on a fair and appropriate basis; or
  - If the Director will be required to relocate in order to take up the position, it is the Company's policy to allow reasonable relocation, travel and subsistence payments. Any such payments will be at the discretion of the Committee;
- The Committee may also alter the performance measures, performance period, vesting period and holding period of the annual bonus or PSP and the proportion of any annual bonus that must be deferred, if the Committee determines that the circumstances of the recruitment merit such alteration. The rationale of any such alterations will be clearly explained in the subsequent Directors' Remuneration Report; and
- The maximum level of variable remuneration which may be granted (excluding buyout awards as referred to below) is 350% of salary, in line with the Policy table set out on pages 117-119, plus any participation in the BAYE in line with the Policy table.

The Committee may make payments or awards in respect of hiring an employee to buy out remuneration arrangements forfeited on leaving a previous employment or engagement. In doing so, the Committee will take account of relevant factors including any performance conditions attached to the forfeited arrangements and the time over which they would have vested or been paid. The Committee will generally seek to structure buyout awards or payments on a comparable basis to the remuneration arrangements forfeited. Any such payments or awards are excluded from the maximum level of variable remuneration referred to above. Buyout awards will ordinarily be granted on the basis that they are subject to forfeiture or 'clawback' in the event of departure within twelve months of joining the Company, although the Committee will retain discretion not to apply forfeiture or clawback in appropriate circumstances.

Any share awards referred to in this section will be granted as far as possible under the Company's share plans. If necessary and subject to the limits referred to above, recruitment awards may be granted outside of these plans.

Where a position is filled internally, any ongoing remuneration obligations or outstanding variable pay elements shall be allowed to continue in accordance with their terms.

Fees payable to a newly appointed Chair or Non-Executive Director will be in line with the policy in place at the time of appointment.

Letters of appointment for the Directors are available for inspection by shareholders at each AGM and during normal business hours at the Company's registered office.

### Service contracts

FDM's policy is that Executive Directors' service agreements should have a notice period of up to twelve months, and each Executive Director has a service contract which may be terminated by the Company or Director by giving twelve months' notice. Each Non-Executive Director has a letter of appointment with the Company which may be terminated by the Company or Director by giving three months' notice. Details of the Directors' service contracts (or letter of appointment in the case of a Non-Executive Director), notice periods and, where applicable, expiry dates are set out below:

Name	Commencement	Expiry	Notice period
Rod Flavell	16 June 2014	–	12 months
Sheila Flavell	16 June 2014	–	12 months
Mike McLaren	16 June 2014	–	12 months
Andy Brown	16 June 2014	–	12 months
Peter Whiting	16 June 2014	–	3 months
Michelle Senecal de Fonseca	15 January 2016	–	3 months
David Lister	9 March 2016	–	3 months
Jacqueline de Rojas	1 October 2019	–	3 months
Alan Kinnear	1 January 2020	–	3 months
Rowena Murray	1 August 2023	–	3 months

### Payments for loss of office

The principles on which the determination of payments for loss of office will be approached are set out below:

#### Payment in lieu of notice

Each Executive Director's service contract contains provision for payment in lieu of notice at the discretion of the Company. Such payment would consist of basic salary plus pension and benefits only for the notice period (or the balance of the notice period if relevant) together with any accrued but untaken holiday pay entitlement. Alternatively, benefits may continue to be provided for the duration of the notice period that would otherwise have applied.

#### Annual bonus

This will be at the discretion of the Committee on an individual basis and the decision as to whether or not to award a bonus in full or in part will be dependent on a number of factors, including the circumstances of the individual's departure and their contribution to the business during the bonus period in question, such that a bonus will be paid only in circumstances that the Committee considers are "good leaver" circumstances. Any bonus amounts paid will be prorated for time in service during the bonus period and will be paid at the usual time (although the Committee retains discretion to pay the bonus earlier in appropriate circumstances). Where bonus deferral would otherwise apply, the Committee may permit the payment of the whole bonus for the year of departure and previous year in cash, although would only do so in circumstances that in the opinion of the Committee amount to compassionate "good leaver" circumstances.

Deferred bonus awards will continue (other than in the case of summary dismissal, or resignation to join or establish a competing business in which case they will lapse/ be forfeited) and will typically be released at the ordinary release date, although the Committee retains discretion to release the award at cessation or at some other date prior to the ordinary release date; release would be of the full award, unless the Committee were to decide to apply a time-based reduction to reflect the proportion of the deferral period served.

## Remuneration Report continued

### PSP

The extent to which any unvested award will vest and be released will be determined in accordance with the rules of the PSP. Unvested awards will normally lapse on cessation of employment. However, the Committee may, in its absolute discretion, determine that on cessation of employment an award that has not yet vested will vest and be released at cessation or at the normal release date (or at some other time between those dates). In either case, the extent of vesting will be determined by the Committee taking into account the extent to which the performance condition is satisfied and, unless the Committee determines otherwise, the period of time elapsed from the date of grant to the date of cessation as a proportion of the vesting period. Awards may then be exercised during such period as the Committee determines.

If an award has vested but not been released (i.e. if it is in a holding period), that award will:

- lapse/ be forfeited if cessation is due to summary dismissal; and
- be released at the ordinary release date if cessation is for any other reason.

The Committee retains discretion to release the award at cessation or at some other date prior to the ordinary release date. Awards will be released to the extent they vested by reference to the performance conditions.

If an award has vested and, where relevant, been released prior to an individual's cessation of employment, the Committee may, in its absolute discretion, allow the award to be exercised for such period as the Committee determines.

### BAYE

If a participant leaves due to death, ill-health, disability or any other reason at the Committee's discretion, Matching Shares related to Purchased Shares acquired in respect of a completed year will vest at the originally anticipated vesting date, unless the Committee decides that they should vest at the date of cessation or some other time. Other Matching Shares will lapse, unless the Committee determines otherwise. Purchased Shares are not forfeited on cessation of employment for any reason.

### Other payments

In appropriate circumstances, payments may also be made in respect of outplacement and legal/ other professional advisor fees. Where a buyout award is made, the leaver provisions would be determined at the time of the award. The Committee reserves the right to make additional exit payments where such payments are made in good faith in discharge of an existing legal obligation (or by way of damages for breach of such an obligation) or by way of settlement or compromise of any claim arising in connection with the termination of a Director's office or employment.

### Existing contractual arrangements

The Committee retains discretion to make any remuneration payment or payment for loss of office outside the policy in this report:

- Where the terms of the payment were agreed before the policy came into effect, provided that, in the case of a payment agreed after 30 April 2015 it is consistent with the Directors' Remuneration Policy applying at the date it was agreed;
- Where the terms of the payment were agreed at a time when the relevant individual was not a Director of the Company (or other person to whom the policy applies) and, in the opinion of the Committee, the payment was not in consideration of the individual becoming a Director of the Company (or other such person);
- Under legacy remuneration arrangements.

For these purposes, "payments" includes the satisfaction of awards of variable remuneration and, in relation to an award over shares, the terms of the payment are agreed at the time the award is granted.

**Statement of consideration of employment conditions elsewhere in the Company**

The Committee generally considers pay and employment conditions elsewhere in the Company when considering the Directors' remuneration. When considering base salary increases, the Committee reviews overall levels of base pay increases offered to other employees. Employees are not actively consulted on Directors' remuneration. Employee share ownership is fundamental to the Company's culture and is reflected in the wide participation in our share incentive plans.

**Statement of consideration of shareholder views**

The Committee is committed to an ongoing dialogue with shareholders and welcomes feedback on the Directors' remuneration. The Committee consulted with the Company's largest shareholders in respect of the development of this Policy (as referred to in further detail on page 106).